(p.167) Prerogatives Without Restrictions
Shelly Kagan and others have criticized the hybrid theory on the grounds that an agent‐centred prerogative, if unaccompanied by agent‐centred restrictions, might allow agents to harm others in pursuit of their personal projects. Scheffler considers in detail an example of Kagan's that illustrates this criticism and purports to show a conflict between the hybrid theory and common‐sense morality. Scheffler responds that the rationale supporting an agent‐centred prerogative can support either a pure‐cost version of the prerogative or a no‐harm version, and that the latter version avoids Kagan's criticism.
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