- Title Pages
- About this book
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Politicians as Informed Supervisors
- 2 The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design
- 3 An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers
- 4 Checks and Balances
- Part II Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design
- 5 Political Economy and Industrial Policy
- 6 Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy
- 7 Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation
- Part III Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design
- 8 Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation
- 9 Collusion and Decentralization
- 10 Concluding Remarks
- Appendix. Translations of Passages Quoted in French
- Incentives and Political Economy
- Oxford University Press
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