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Value, Reality, and Desire$

Graham Oddie

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199273416

Published to British Academy Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199273413.001.0001

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Value, Reality, and Desire
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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