Are there Universal Principles or Forms of Evidential Inference? Of Inference Networks and Onto-Epistemology
Are there Universal Principles or Forms of Evidential Inference? Of Inference Networks and Onto-Epistemology
This chapter discusses the limitations of approaches to modelling and handling evidential issues using hierarchical network representations. Such models of evidential inference rest on the compound proposition that real-world evidential inference usually or always consists of propositional ‘atoms’ (i.e. relatively granular propositional statements about states of the world) that are linked together by nomological entities of some kind, entities that are often — but not always — called ‘generalisations’. These sorts of models or representations of evidential inference are referred to as ‘network-and-generalisation’ models of evidential inference. It is argued that for certain important problems, especially where these concern meaning and human understanding, these need to be complemented by other methods.
Keywords: evidence, hierarchical network representations, evidential inference, generalisations, network-and-generalisation models
British Academy Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
